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Labor and Employment Law
by W. Melvin Haas, IHf
William M. Clifton, III**
and W. Jonathan Martin, II*'*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys recent developments in state statutory and
common law that affect labor and employment relations of Georgia
employers. Accordingly, it surveys published decisions from the Georgia
Court of Appeals and Georgia Supreme Court from June 1, 2003 to May
31, 2004. This Article also highlights specific revisions to the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.").
II.

RECENT LEGISLATION

Without regard to the Georgia General Assembly's changes to the
"Workers' Compensation" section' of the Georgia Labor and Industrial
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DEVELOPING LABOR LAw (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., ABA/BNA, 4th ed. 2001 & Supps.
2002-2004). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Alabama.
** Member in the firm of Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLC, Macon, Georgia.
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1. Recent developments in workers' compensation law are discussed in H. Michael
Bagley et al., Workers' Compensation, 56 MERCER L. REV. 479, 479-80 (2004) (discussing
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Relations Code ("Labor Code"), 2 the General Assembly passed two
noteworthy amendments to Georgia's Labor Code during the survey
period.
First, the General Assembly addressed the so-called "Living Wage"'
movement by creating O.C.G.A. section 34-4-3.14 to preempt "[amny and
all wage or employment benefit mandates adopted by any local
government."' The General Assembly did so based, in part, upon the
following determination: "In order for businesses to remain competitive
and yet attract and retain the highest possible caliber of employees,
private enterprises in this state must be allowed to function in a uniform
environment with respect to mandated wage rates and employment
benefits."6 In so doing, the General Assembly eliminated what it
perceived as being wage and benefit disparities "creat[ing] an anticompetitive marketplace [and] foster[ing] job and business relocation."

recent legislative amendments).
2. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1 to -421 (2004).
3. The Fair Labor Standard Act, which codifies the federal minimum wage, allows state
and local governments to enact minimum wages higher than the federal standard.
However, until recently, few states and municipalities have taken this opportunity. 29
U.S.C. § 218(a) (2000). Based upon the premise that the federal minimum wage has failed
to keep pace with inflation, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
("ACORN") began a "Living Wage" Campaign in the mid-1990s in an effort to pressure
municipalities into raising minimum wages at the local level around the country. See
ACORN Living Wage Res. Ctr. Web Site, at http:J/www.livingwagecampaign.org (Aug. 2,
2004). Indeed, ACORN's website declares that it had "Living Wage Campaigns Underway"
in both Atlanta and Athens, Georgia. Id. So far, ACORN counts among its victories 123
cities and counties that allegedly have passed living wage ordinances. Id.
4. O.C.G.A § 34-4-3.1 (2004).
5. Id. § 34-4-3.1(b). In relevant part, O.C.G.A. section 34-4-3.1(a)(6)-(b)(3) provides:
(6) "Wage or employment benefit mandate" means any requirement adopted by a
local government entity which requires an employer to pay any or all of its
employees a wage rate or provide employment benefits not otherwise required
under this Code or federal law.
(b)(1) Any and all wage or employment benefit mandates adopted by any local
government entity are hereby preempted.
(2) No local government entity may adopt, maintain, or enforce by charter,
ordinance, purchase agreement, contract, regulation, rule, or resolution, either
directly or indirectly, a wage or employment benefit mandate.
(3) Any local government entity may offer its own employees employment benefits.
O.C.GA. § 34-4-3.1.
6. 2003 Ga. Laws 1258, § 1.
7. Id.
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Second, the General Assembly amended O.C.G.A. section 34-8-218 to
repeal the "State Unemployment Tax Moratorium."9 Although lifting
the Unemployment Moratorium may have been necessary to meet
unemployment needs during an economic downturn, the increased tax
liability placed further burdens on businesses already affected by the
recession. 10
III.

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

Employment at Will
An employment-at-will contract has at least two notable characteristics: first, either the employee or employer may terminate the employment relationship at any time, with or without cause; second, and a
corollary of the first characteristic, upon the termination of an employment-at-will contract, the employee may not successfully maintain a
wrongful termination claim."
While the doctrine is gradually eroding in other jurisdictions, 2
O.C.G.A. section 34-7-1'3 provides that employment contracts in
Georgia are at-will unless the parties implicitly or explicitly contract
otherwise.'4 Generally, this means that in the absence of a specified
length of employment, the relationship is employment-at-will.' 5
Contract provisions specifying "'permanent employment,' 'employment
A.

8. 2002 Ga. Laws 1119 (amending O.C.G.A. § 34-8-21 (1991)).
9. Tony Adams, Unemployment Tax Pinches Bottom line: Georgiacompanies take the
hit as four-year moratorium ends, Ledger Enquirer.com, at httpJ/www.ledger-enquirer.com/mld/ledgerenquirer/news/8181309.htm (Mar. 14, 2004).
10. Id.
11. JAMES W. WIMBERLY, JR., GEORGIA EMPLOYMENT LAw 20-21 (3d ed. & Supp. 2004).
12. See Amy Carlson, States are Eroding At-Will Employment Doctrines: Will
Pennsylvania Join the Crowd?, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 511 (2004); Melanie Robin Galberry,
Employers Beware: South Carolina'sPublic Policy Exception to the At-Will Employment
Doctrine is Likely to Keep Expanding, 51 S.C. L. REv. 406 (2000); Cortlan H. Maddux,
Employers Beware! The Emerging Use of Promissory Estoppel as an Exception to
Employment-At-Will, 49 BAYLOR L. REv. 197 (1997); Mark A. Fahleson, The Public Policy
Exception to Employment-At-Will-When Should CourtsDefer to the Legislature?,72 NEB.
L. REv. 956 (1993); Kimberly Anne Huffman, Salt v. Applied Analytical,Inc.: Clarifyingthe
Confusion in North Carolina'sEmployment-at-Will Doctrine,70 N.C. L. REv. 2087 (1992);
Richard J. Pratt, UnilateralModification of Employment Handbooks: FurtherEncroachments on the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 197 (1990).
13. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 (1998).
14. Id.
15. See generally WIMBERLY, supra note 11, at 20-21.
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for life,' or 'employment until retirement'" are indefinite, and therefore,
are employment-at-will contracts. 6
In Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Crowley,"7 the
court of appeals reaffirmed the general principle of employment-at-will:
"The public policy of Georgia is clear and unambiguous that, absent a
definite term of employment, the contract is terminable at will.""
In that case Crowley, an attorney, had represented Georgia Farm
Bureau "on a case-by-case basis" for more than seventeen years. 19
After a verbal confrontation with a Georgia Farm Bureau employee,
Crowley was asked to apologize, which he refused to do. When Georgia
Farm Bureau directed Crowley to return forty-two active case files,
Crowley sued alleging, inter alia, breach of contract. Crowley argued
that Georgia Farm Bureau had agreed that once it turned a file over to
him it would not be removed unless he "'didn't do the job[,]"' or was
disbarred.2 ° Although the court of appeals stated numerous reasons for
affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendant on
Crowley's breach of contract claim, it did so in part because "there was
no stated duration of the agreement... [and] absent
a definite term of
21
employment, the contract [was] terminable at will."
Similarly, in Cramp v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.2 2 the court of appeals
relied upon the doctrine of employment-at-will to limit an employee's
ability to bring a fraud claim against his former employer.23 The
decision in Cramp arose from the acquisition of Unisource Worldwide,
Inc. ("Unisource") by Georgia-Pacific Corp. ("Georgia Pacific"). Before
the acquisition, Unisource offered additional severance benefits to some
of its employees, including Cramp, its vice president of customer
service."
Unisource promised Cramp that if his employment "was
terminated other than for cause, or should he resign following a change
of control,. . . [he] would be entitled to [twelve] months continued salary,
with the first six months guaranteed and the
remaining six months
2
subject to offset by subsequent employment." 1

16. Id. at 20 (quoting Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613, 280 S.E.2d 442
(1978)).
17. 263 Ga. App. 659, 588 S.E.2d 840 (2003).
18. Id. at 662, 588 S.E.2d at 843 (citing Schuck v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 244
Ga. App. 147, 149, 534 S.E.2d 533 (2000)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 660, 588 S.E.2d at 842.
21. Id. at 662, 588 S.E.2d at 843.
22. 266 Ga. App. 38, 596 S.E.2d 212 (2004).
23. Id. at 40, 596 S.E.2d at 214.
24. Id. at 38-39, 596 S.E.2d at 213.
25. Id. at 39, 596 S.E.2d at 213.
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After the acquisition, Georgia-Pacific's vice president of marketing
offered Cramp a job and allegedly told Cramp, "'we want you to come
down to Atlanta and continue the job you're doing.'"2" The job offer
was contingent upon Cramp's release of the severance benefits previously offered by Unisource.27 In part, the written offer stated:
As you are no doubt aware, employment at Georgia-Pacific, as with
most employers, is "at will" and thus can be terminated at any time
and for any reason not prohibited by law, either at the option of the
employee or the option of the company. Similarly, as a matter of
policy, Georgia-Pacific reserves the right to make changes in the terms
and. conditions of employment of all of its regular salaried employees 2
After Cramp accepted the offer and moved to Atlanta, he discovered
that his duties with Georgia-Pacific differed from the duties he had
performed with Unisource. Eventually, Georgia-Pacific moved Cramp's
duties to other executives and eliminated his position, resulting in his
termination. Cramp sued alleging fraud.29
Although Cramp admitted that the nature of his at-will employment
precluded him from "maintain[ing] a cause of action for an alleged
misrepresentation concerning the length of his employment, or promise
related to future compensation,"" he argued that Georgia-Pacific
fraudulently induced him into relinquishing his additional severance
benefits by misrepresenting the nature of his position with them."l The
court of appeals rejected Cramp's argument, holding that an employee
cannot justifiably rely upon an employer's representation regarding the
particular responsibilities of a position because, in the context of at-will
employment, "such a representation was an unenforceable promise."3 2
Thus, a representation regarding the responsibilities of a position cannot
form the basis of a fraud claim. 33
Likewise, in Shores v. Modern Transportation Services, Inc.,34 the
court of appeals limited an employee's recovery in tort under the theory

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 39-40, 296 S.E.2d at 214.
30. Id.
31. Id. The elements of a fraud claim are: (1) false representation by a defendant; (2)
scienter; (3) intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (4) justifiable
reliance by the plaintiff; and (5) damage to the plaintiff. Id. (citing Pyle v. City of
Cedartown, 240 Ga. App. 445, 447, 524 S.E.2d 7, 9 (1999)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 262 Ga. App. 293, 585 S.E.2d 664 (2003).
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that no property right existed when the employment was at-will.35 In
that case Thomas Shores was operating the lead locomotive of a train
when a truck driver, employed by Modern Transportation, collided with
the locomotive and the freight car behind Shores. Shores was not
physically injured, but he complained of post-traumatic stress syndrome,
The court
which prevented him from working as an engineer.3 6
dismissed Shores's tort action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress because he failed to show the elements of either physical injury
or monetary loss. 7 The court held that Shores's injury resulted in no
pecuniary loss because Shores had no "reasonable expectation of
38
continued employment to establish a property right protected by law."
Finally, the court, in Wilson v. City of Sardis,3 reaffirmed the
application of the doctrine of employment-at-will for public and private
employees when there is no statutory or contractual bar to termination.' Wilson, the chief of police for the City of Sardis, misrepresented
the employment status of a police academy student. After the misrepresentation was discovered, the City of Sardis, led by the mayor and
several city counsel members, terminated Wilson for falsifying the
application. Wilson filed suit against the mayor and various city counsel
members for tortious interference with his contract and against the city
itself for "wrongful termination." 1 Regarding the wrongful termination
claims, the court of appeals held:
[A] public employee has a property interest in employment when that
employee can be fired only for cause .... In the absence of a contractual or statutory "for cause" requirement, however, the employee serves
"at will" and may be discharged at any time for any reason or no
reason, with no cause of action for wrongful termination under state
law. Such "at will" employees have no legitimate claim of entitlement

35. Id. at 295, 585 S.E.2d at 666.

36. Id. at 294, 585 S.E.2d at 665.
37. Id. at 295, 585 S.E.2d at 665.
38. Id., 585 S.E.2d at 666.
39. 264 Ga. App. 178, 590 S.E.2d 383 (2003).

40. Id. at 179, 590 S.E.2d at 385. Cf Jones v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of
Georgia, 262 Ga. App. 75, 585 S.E.2d 138 (2003) (Despite the doctrine of employment-atwill, the court of appeals held there was an issue of material fact for a jury regarding

whether the "action" taken against Jones was within the purview of O.C.G.A. section 45-14, which provides that no action may be taken against a public employee who reports
possible activity of fraud, waste, or abuse of state programs that are under the jurisdiction
of the public employer).
41. Wilson, 264 Ga. App. at 178-79, 590 S.E.2d at 385.
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have no property interest
to continued employment and, thus,
2
protected by the due process clause.'
B.

Breach of Employment Contracts

The following cases demonstrate the problems and unnecessary legal
costs associated with poor draftsmanship in employment agreements.
Consequently, a practitioner should always include unambiguous and
definite terms when defining the employer-employee relationship in an
employment contract.
To form a valid employment contract, the basic rules of contracts
apply: offer, acceptance, and consideration. Further, an employment
contract must contain a designation of the employee's place of employment, the period of employment, 4 the nature of services to be rendered,
and the amount or type of compensation. The terms of an employment
be enforceable, and definitivecontract must be sufficiently definite to
44
ness is a question of law for the judge.
When interpreting employment contracts, courts are guided by three
general principles. If the contract is not ambiguous, the court will
enforce the contract according to its terms and dismiss all technical or
arbitrary rules of construction. 45 However, if the contract is ambiguous,
then interpreting the terms is a question of law for the court. If the
rules of
court cannot negate the ambiguity after applying the statutory
46
construction, then the interpretation will go to the jury.
47
illusReichman v. Southern Ear, Nose & Throat Surgeons, PC.
the
compenin
trates the practical dangers associated with ambiguities
Reichman, a physician,
sation clauses of employment contracts."
Ear, Nose & Throat
Southern
with
contract
signed an employment
collect all fees
would
SENT
that
Surgeons, P.C. ("SENT") providing
would
collections
the
and
he
rendered,
for
the
services
charged
Reichman
then become the property of SENT. SENT, in turn, would pay Reichman
a percentage of the collected fees after making certain deductions. The
agreement also provided that either party could terminate the contract
The contract provided that upon such
with ninety days notice. 49

42. Id. (citing Duck v. Jacobs, 739 F. Supp. 1545, 1548 (S.D. Ga. 1990)).
43. If the period of employment is not specified, then an employment-at-will contract
is implied. See WIMBERLY, supra note 11, at 6-7.
44. Id.
45. Mon Ami Intl, Inc. v. Gale, 264 Ga. App. 739, 741,592 S.E.2d 83, 86 (2003) (citing
Atlanta Dev. v. Emerald Capital Invs., 258 Ga. App. 472, 477, 574 S.E.2d 585, 589 (2002)).
46. Id. at 741, 592 S.E.2d at 86.
47. 266 Ga. App. 696, 598 S.E.2d 12 (2004).
48. Id. at 697-98, 598 S.E.2d at 14-15.
49. Id.
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termination, Reichman "'shall be entitled to receive compensation due
[him] through the effective date of termination, as calculated pursuant
to the Compensation Formula.'" 5 °
Reichman became dissatisfied with his compensation and exercised his
rights under the contract.
SENT argued that Reichman's final
compensation was limited to fees collected, whereas Reichman argued he
was entitled to be paid for all fees billed up to and including the last day
he provided services.5 1
The dispute arose out of the amount "due" to Reichman. 52 Because
the word "due" was ambiguous, the court of appeals turned to the
principles of contract construction 53 to interpret the meaning of the
contract.54 The court of appeals concluded that when the construction
of a contract is in doubt, the construction goes most strongly against the
party who drafted the agreement.55 Thus, the court of appeals held:
"[Because] SENT drafted the agreement here, the contract should be
read to mean that SENT is required to compensate Reichman for any
fees that he generated while he worked for SENT, even though the fees
for such work were collected after Reichman ended his employment with
SENT.""
While the court's holding rests on well-known statutory
principles of contract interpretation, the practical lesson for employment
practitioners is simple: Failure to carefully avoid ambiguity in compensation clauses will undoubtedly result in unnecessary and costly litigation.
Mon Ami International, Inc. v. Gale57 illustrates that rules of
statutory construction will not always resolve a dispute regarding an
employment contract.5 8 In that case the husband/executor of a deceased
employee's estate brought an action to enforce an employment contract
drafted by his wife that gave her an option to purchase at least five
percent of the total shares of stock in the company. A few months later,
the employment contract was amended. The deceased drafted and
signed the amended contract as well.59 The amended contract provided
that her "'stock ownership ... shall be increased from [five percent] to
[ten percent]."' ° The company presented evidence that the deceased

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 699, 598 S.E.2d at 16.
O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2 (1982).
Reichman, 266 Ga. App. at 699, 598 S.E.2d at 16.
Id. at 699-700, 598 S.E.2d at 16.
Id. at 700, 598 S.E.2d at 16.
264 Ga. App. 739, 592 S.E.2d 83 (2003).
Id. at 741, 592 S.E.2d at 87.
Id. at 740, 592 S.E.2d at 86.
Id.
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never exercised her option."' At a second trial on the matter,62 the
court prevented the jury from considering the intent of the parties and
ruled for the company as a matter of law.' The executor appealed.'
On appeal Mon Ami argued that the contract was too vague to be
enforceable because it lacked specificity as to the "stock" at issue, and it
failed to identify when the ten percent ownership was to be calculated. 5 The court of appeals disagreed, stating "'[tihe test of an enforceable contract is whether it is expressed in language sufficiently plain
and explicit to convey what the parties agreed upon.'"66 The court also
held that the amendment "when read with the employment contract as
a whole, shows that the stock to which the amendment refers" was stock
in Mon Ami, and that the ten percent figure was sufficiently specific to
Nevertheless, the court determined the "ambiguity
be enforceable.
[could not] be resolved by the rules of contract construction."r, Therefore, the court remanded the case for factual determinations on the
intent of the parties.69
C.

Employment Contracts and ArbitrationClauses

In JOJA Partners, LLC. v. Abrams Properties,Inc.,7" the court of
appeals determined the correct application of provisions of Georgia's
Arbitration Code7 ' to an Asset Management Agreement.72 Specifically, the Asset Management Agreement provided that plaintiff ("jOjA")
would provide certain services relating to the administration, management, supervision, leasing, and disposition of Abrams's real estate
assets.73 In part the agreement provided that "[jOjA] is, and shall at

61. Id.
62. At the first trial, the jury concluded that Mon Ami did not breach a fiduciary duty,
but the trial court disagreed with the jury and granted a new trial. Before retrial the court
granted a motion in limine, which prevented Mon Ami from presenting evidence on
plaintiffs status as a ten percent shareholder. Id. at 739-40, 592 S.E.2d at 85.
63. Id. at 742, 592 S.E.2d at 86-87.
64. Id. at 740, 592 S.E.2d at 85.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 742, 592 S.E.2d at 87 (citing Kueffer Crane & Hoist Serv., Inc. v. Passarella,
247 Ga. App. 327, 330, 543 S.E.2d 113, 116 (2000)).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 741, 592 S.E.2d at 86.
69. Id. at 742, 592 S.E.2d at 87.
70. 262 Ga. App. 209, 585 S.E.2d 168 (2003).
71. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2 (1982 & Supp. 2004).
72. JOJA Partners,262 Ga. App. at 211, 585 S.E.2d at 170-71.
73. Id. at 209, 585 S.E.2d at 170.
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all times during the Term be, an independent contractor, and not an
employee of [Abrams]."74
When a dispute arose regarding certain commissions, jOjA notified
Abrams of the termination of the agreement and its election to pursue
arbitration. When Adams sued jOjA for breach of contract, jOjA moved
to compel arbitration. 5
The superior court denied jOjA's motion, inter alia, on the basis that
the arbitration provision contained in the contract was unenforceable
because the parties failed to follow the prerequisites of the Georgia
Arbitration Code. 76 Specifically, the superior court relied upon O.C.G.A. section 9-9-2(c)(9), 7 which provides that an arbitration provision
in an employment contract is unenforceable "unless the clause agreeing
to arbitrate is initialed by all signatories at the time of the execution of
JOjA requested and received a discretionary
the agreement."7"
appeal.7 9
The court of appeals acknowledged that "the Georgia Arbitration Code
'is in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed and not
extended beyond its plain terms."'8 0 However, the court decided the
trial court erred in applying the code subsection requiring initials for an
enforceable arbitration agreement and stated that " '[w ihere the contract
of employment clearly denominates the other party as an independent
contractor, that relationship is presumed to be true unless the evidence
shows that the employer assumed such control.'"'" The contract at
issue was not an employment contract because it stated the position at
issue would be "'an independent contractor, and not an employee of" the
company.82 Furthermore, the court of appeals decided that broadly
interpreting the "terms and conditions of employment" 3 to include
independent contractors, in addition to employees, would violate the
court's strict interpretation of the Georgia Arbitration Code."4 Thus,
the court held O.C.G.A. section 9-9-2(c)(9) was not applicable to

74. Id., 585 S.E.2d at 171.
75. Id. at 209-10, 585 S.E.2d at 170.
76. Id.
77. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(9) (1982 & Supp. 2004).
78. Id.
79. JOJA Partners,262 Ga. App. at 209, 585 S.E.2d at 169.
80. Id. at 211,585 S.E.2d at 170 (quoting Pinnacle Constr. Co. v. Osborne, 218 Ga. App.
366, 367, 460 S.E.2d 880, 881 (1995)).
81. Id. at 212, 585 S.E.2d at 171 (quoting Teachers' Retirement Sys. v. Forehand, 234
Ga. App. 437, 441, 506 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1998)).
82. Id.
83. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(9).
84. JOJA Partners,262 Ga. App. at 212, 585 S.E.2d at 171-72.
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independent contractors, and the contract did not require the initials of
the parties for consent to arbitration as an employment contract
would.85
IV.

MISCELLANEOUS EMPLOYMENT TORTS

Negligent Hiring or Retention
Increasingly, employers are finding themselves the subjects of
negligent employment practices claims.8 6 One such case was Lewis v.
Northside Hospital, Inc.,87 wherein an employee who was injured in a
shoving incident with a co-worker sought relief for "negligent retention."
Specifically, Lewis and Moore, co-workers, argued over work related
issues, which led to an altercation. 88 Lewis testified that during the
altercation she felt a "'punch, poke, or something in my back from
[Moore],' which [she] described as more annoying than painful." s In
response, "Lewis turned around and shoved Moore, who fell over some
bins."90 Northside Hospital fired both employees. Although Lewis
acknowledged that the exclusive remedy provision of the Georgia
Workers' Compensation Act barred recovery for physical assault, she
argued she had mental injuries, which generally are not compensable
under the Act.9 1 The court of appeals disagreed and determined that
the Workers' Compensation Act was Lewis's sole remedy. 2
Relying upon Bryant v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,93 the court of appeals
observed that "where an employee suffers a physical injury in the course
of employment[,]... a related claim for mental damages will be barred
by the Act's exclusive remedy provision." 4 In the case of Lewis, the
A.

85. Id. at 213, 585 S.E.2d at 172.
86. Under O.C.G.A. section 34-7-20, "[tlhe employer is bound to exercise ordinary care
in the selection of employees and not to retain them after knowledge of incompetency."
O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20 (2004). Courts have held that this statute imposes a duty on the
employer to "warn other employees of dangers incident to employment that 'the employer
knows or ought to know but which are unknown to the employee.'" Tecumseh Prods. Co.
v. Rigdon, 250 Ga. App. 739, 740, 552 S.E.2d 910, 912 (2001) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20
(2004)).
87. 267 Ga. App. 288, 599 S.E.2d 267 (2004).
88. Id. at 288-89, 599 S.E.2d at 268.
89. Id. at 289, 599 S.E.2d at 268.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 289-90, 599 S.E.2d at 268-69 (citing Fowler Oil Co. v. Hamby, 192 Ga. App.
422, 385 S.E.2d 106 (1989)).
92. Id. at 290, 599 S.E.2d at 269.
93. 203 Ga. App. 770, 417 S.E.2d 688 (1992).
94. Lewis, 267 Ga. App. at 290, 599 S.E.2d at 269.
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court stated the evidence, "even viewed most favorably to Lewis ...
shows some, if [only] very small, level of physical harm. Furthermore, a
battery is considered to be a physical injury."" Consequently, Lewis's
negligent retention claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provision
of the Workers' Compensation Act.96
In contrast, the employer in TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings,7
was not as fortunate when its hiring practices were reviewed by the
court of appeals. In that case the employer hired a maintenance man
who strangled the plaintiff's daughter to death. Following a jury's
award of more than $15 million, the employer appealed.98 The court
of appeals relied upon several key issues in affirming the.jury's verdict:
[First:] the apartment complex had hired Calvin Oliver, a convicted
felon and recidivist, as a maintenance worker and gave him full access
to all the residents' keys.
[Second:]
Although Oliver told [defendant] that he had been in trouble with
the law and had been in jail, [defendant] did not check into his
criminal history or disclose that information to her supervisors. In fact,
Oliver had spent most of his adult life in prison or on parole. He had
felony convictions for rape, armed robbery, robbery, robbery by force,
larceny, credit card theft, and at least three residential burglaries.
[Third:]
Despite knowing that another TGM region required criminal
background checks on prospective employees, [the manager] did
nothing of this nature. Instead, [the manager], who was directly
involved in the hiring decision, testified that she wrote "N/A, not
applicable" next to the space for criminal history check on Oliver's
employment paperwork that she sent to TGM's office in New York. 9
Finding strong cases for both negligent hiring and negligent retention,
the court of appeals observed:
TGM learned that a series of unforced entries and burglaries had
occurred at the premises since Oliver had been hired; that some
residents suspected an employee; and that Oliver had been discovered
in one apartment without authorization. Also, one resident had even
suggested that criminal background checks be performed because she
was positive that an employee was the culprit. These facts raised an
issue for the jury of whether TGM, acting reasonably, should have
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Id. at 292, 599 S.E.2d at 270.
Id.
264 Ga. App. 456, 590 S.E.2d 807 (2003).
Id. at 456-57, 590 S.E.2d at 812.
Id. at 457, 590 S.E.2d at 812.
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taken additional steps to investigate the criminal background of their
employees, including Oliver.'"
B.

Tortious Interference with Employment Contracts

To recover under a theory of tortious interference with business
relations, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant: "(1) acted
improperly and without privilege, (2) acted purposely and with malice
with the intent to injure, (3) induced a third party or parties not to enter
into or continue a business relationship with the plaintiff, and (4) caused
the plaintiff financial injury."10 ' However, "[tlo be liable for tortious
interference with business relations, [a defendant] must be a stranger
to the business relationship giving rise to and underpinning" the cause
of action. 02 During the survey period, many of the cases decided by
the court of appeals rested upon the issue of whether a defendant was
a stranger to a business relationship.
For example, in Cox v. City of Atlanta,0 3 the Atlanta-Fulton County
Recreation Authority hired Atlanta Police Department ("APD") officers
to provide security for the Atlanta Braves games at Atlanta-Fulton
County Stadium. When the games were relocated to Turner Field, the
Atlanta Braves organization assumed the management of the stadium,
including security. The new management stressed a preference for offduty APD officers to provide security. Eugene Cox was a senior patrol
officer and submitted a bid on behalf of "EOC3 SECURITY SERVICE"
("EOC3"). The commander of the APD field operations division called
the director of stadium operations at the time of bidding to ask about the
plans for the APD. The director told the commander about Cox's
proposal.'O° The commander responded that he was concerned "because Cox, as a senior patrol officer, 'could not supervise other patrol
officers.'"10 5 In addition the commander had concerns about conflicts
of interest, off-duty assignment approval, and frequency zones regarding
EOC3. The stadium director informed Cox that he would not give EOC3
the contract until these issues were resolved and approved in writing.
The night before the first game, the APD informed Cox that he was not
approved to perform the off-duty security with the Braves. APD

100. Id. at 459-60, 590 S.E.2d at 814.
101. Wilson v. City of Sardis, 264 Ga. App. 178, 179-80, 590 S.E.2d 383, 385 (2003)
(quoting Renden, Inc. v. Liberty Real Estate, 213 Ga. App. 333, 334, 444 S.E.2d 814, 817
(1994)).
102. Cox v. City of Atlanta, 266 Ga. App. 329, 332, 596 S.E.2d 785, 788 (2004).
103. 266 Ga. App. 329, 596 S.E.2d 785 (2004).
104. Id. at 330, 596 S.E.2d at 787.
105. Id.
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provided the Braves with security for the first thirty days of the season,
and later, other APD officers were hired to coordinate security.106
Cox complained that the City of Atlanta and several officials,
"'intentionally and wrongfully induced the [Atlanta] Braves not to enter
into or continue a business relationship with Plaintiffs, causing them
financial hardship.' 1 The trial court found that Cox and his team
failed to establish a case of tortious interference,"' and Cox appealed,
contending the "stranger doctrine" did not apply."°
The court of
appeals disagreed." °
The court of appeals held that Cox could not rely upon the "stranger
doctrine" because his team was comprised of APD officers, and the
officers needed APD's approval for all off-duty assignments." Indeed,
when submitting his proposal to the Braves, "EOC3 advised that it 'has
currently assembled a[n] experienced and reliable team of [APD] officers
on Staff.'""'
Consequently, the court of appeals determined that Cox
had "invoked the APD's internal procedures for extra job requests
because all APD officers were subject to such procedures.""
Thus,
"the APD had a legitimate interest in both the contract itself and those
involved in executing it."" 4 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's ruling."5
Similarly, in Wilson v. City of Sardis,"' the court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to city officials who related their
concerns regarding the prospective employment of a law enforcement
officer."'
In that case the chief of police for the City of Sardis,
Edgebert Wilson, misrepresented the employment status of a police
academy student. Wilson applied for a position as the chief of police for
the City of Harlem. He was later informed that the city council might
ask for his resignation due to the misrepresentation and that a member
of the city council had contacted someone in Harlem regarding his
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Id. at 329-31, 596 S.E.2d at 786-87.
Id. at 329, 596 S.E.2d at 786.
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Id. at 332, 596 S.E.2d at 788.
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Id. at 333, 596 S.E.2d at 788.
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Id., 596 S.E.2d at 789.
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Id. at 329, 596 S.E.2d at 786.
264 Ga. App. 178, 590 S.E.2d 383 (2003).
Id. at 180, 590 S.E.2d at 386.
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application
for employment. Harlem hired someone other than Wil118
son.
Following his termination, Wilson sued the city council and mayor for
tortious interference with his employment contract and sued the City of
Sardis for wrongful termination." 9 On Wilson's claim for tortious
interference, the court of appeals held that because the mayor and city
council members were not third parties to the events and were
authorized to discharge Wilson, Wilson's claim for interference regarding
the City of Harlem failed as a matter of law.
C.

Discrimination--SexualHarassment

While the common law tort of sexual harassment continues to
evolve,12 ' state courts are also vested with concurrent jurisdiction over
'
harassment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 2
As a general matter, there are two types of sexual harassment that
constitute a cause of action under Title VII: (1) quid pro quo, which are
threats that are carried out, and (2) hostile environment, which consists
of 'bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe
or pervasive to create a hostile working environment.'"'2 " To constitute a hostile work environment and find liability, courts require
evidence that shows the conduct at24 issue was severe enough to change
the conditions of the employment.'
In Liebno v. Drexel Chemical Co.,' 25 the court of appeals affirmed the
grant of summary judgment for defendant employer on plaintiff's claim
of hostile working environment brought pursuant to Title VII.' 2 6 In
Liebno the employee alleged that her supervisor created a hostile work
made the following sexual advances toward her,
environment when 2he
7
which she rejected:'
0)
Liebno's supervisor put his arm around Liebno's shoulders, which led
Liebno to believe that her supervisor was going to thank her for
working late. Instead of thanking her, the supervisor took off his

118. Id. at 178, 590 S.E.2d at 384-85.
119. Id. at 179, 590 S.E.2d at 385.

120. Id. at 179-80, 590 S.E.2d at 385.
121. CHARLES R. ADAMS III, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 2-3 (2003).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000).
123.

Liebno v. Drexel Chem. Co., 262 Ga. App. 517, 519, 586 S.E.2d 67, 70 (2003)

(quoting Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)).
124. Id. at 519, 586 S.E.2d at 70.

125. 262 Ga. App. 517, 586 S.E.2d 67 (2003).
126. Id. at517, 586 S.E.2d at 69.
127. Id. at 518, 586 S.E.2d at 69.
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glasses and said that Liebno might smack him for what he was about
to do, and then tried to kiss her. Liebno turned away so that she could
not be kissed, and the supervisor immediately let go of Liebno and
backed away from her. The supervisor then asked Liebno if she wanted
him. Liebno responded that she did not, and the supervisor then said,
"You do things to me." Liebno asked, "Like what?" and
the supervisor
128
said, "Like this," and grabbed Liebno's right buttock.
This was the only incident that ever occurred, and Liebno subsequently filed a complaint pursuant to the company's sexual harassment policy.
The investigation that followed could not substantiate the complaint;
however, Liebno's supervisor was reassigned. A month later, Liebno
gave notice of her resignation but agreed to remain as a part-time
employee after her resignation date to help train her replacement. Her
supervisor initially agreed to this arrangement but later informed her
that management wanted her to leave permanently on her original
resignation day. Later, Liebno learned that her former supervisor
returned to the office after her last day.'29
Liebno sued the company for sexual harassment and retaliation under
Title VII. The trial court granted summary judgment for the company,
and Liebno appealed. i 0 On appeal the court affirmed the judgment
because, although the isolated incident was "clearly inappropriate and
reprehensible," it was insufficient to show the conduct was severe or
pervasive to create a hostile working environment. 3 ' The court then
determined the retaliation claim must fail because the company did not
take any adverse employment action against Liebno before her voluntary
resignation. 132
V.

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

To hold an employer liable for a tort committed biD an employee, the
plaintiff must show that at the time of the incident the employee was
engaged in the employer's business and not in the employee's own
personal matter."
Understandably, the "scope of employment" prong
is the subject of frequent litigation when an employee injures a third
party. Several cases during the survey period illustrate the considerations important to Georgia Courts of Appeals.
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In CLO White Co. v. Lattimore,"" an employee for CLO White Co.
("CLO") was on his way to work and was on his cell phone with his
employer when he was involved in an accident with plaintiff. Plaintiff
sued CLO under the theory of respondeat superior, claiming the
employee was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the
accident because he was conducting business on his cell phone. The trial
court denied CLO's motion for summary judgment, which prompted CLO
to appeal.' 35
Normally, barring special circumstances, an employer is not responsible for a servant while the servant is driving to and from work. 3 '
However, the court of appeals decided the employee's phone call to his
office while on the way to work created a jury issue as to whether the
employee was acting in the scope of his employment.' y Accordingly,
the court of appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment. 3
In contrast, in Torres v. Tandy Corp.,'3 9 the court determined an
employee was not acting within the scope of her job when she had an
accident while on her way to work. 4 ° In that case Leah Raffield was
driving to work when she made a detour to pick up breakfast for herself,
her boss, and her friend. While en route to purchase breakfast, she hit
a pedestrian who was caught in the middle of the intersection when the
light changed. The pedestrian sued Raffield's employer under the theory
of respondeat superior for Raffield's negligence.'
In affirming the jury's verdict, the court of appeals noted the evidence
supported a finding that Raffield was not acting within the scope of her
employment because running the errand for her boss was not a job
requirement.'42 Further, her job would not have been imperiled had
she refused to do so.'"
Likewise, in Wright v. Pine Hills Country Club, Inc.,144 a reporter,
Yawn, attended a festival for her own entertainment. While Yawn was
at the festival, she ran into a colleague who was assigned to cover the
festival. The two co-workers agreed that Yawn would take over the
festival coverage, and the other reporter left. Yawn was seen at the
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festival drinking two glasses of wine, and later, Yawn was involved in
an auto accident, which resulted in her death and the injury of another
driver. The injured driver sued the newspaper under respondeat
superior for injuries caused by Yawn. 4"
Although the law generally provides that an employee is not acting
within the scope of employment while driving to or from work, an
exception exists when the employee is on a special mission at the
Nevertheless, the court of appeals held
direction of the employer."
that the "special mission" exception did not apply because Yawn was not
acting at the request of her employer.' 47 Rather, Yawn acted on her
own volition when she agreed to cover the assignment for her co-worker.
Therefore, even though Yawn volunteered to cover the event, her
employer was not aware of the decision and did not authorize her to
operate within the scope of her employment on a special mission. 8
Because the "application of the special mission exception requires that
the errand or mission itself be a special or uncustomary one made at the
employer's request or direction[,]"4 9 the employer was not liable.
VI.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

Agreements that place general restraints on trade and have the effect
of lessening competition and encouraging monopolies, are void as against
public policy.'" Generally, noncompetition agreements are disfavored
in contractual relations because they place restrictions on trade, thereby
thwarting competition.'' Nonetheless, courts will uphold a noncompete agreement when the agreement merely places a partial restraint
upon trade.'5 2 A noncompetition agreement is valid as a partial restraint
on trade if the agreement is (1) written, (2) has a specific time, (3)
territorial limitation, and (4) activity restriction.'" Additionally, the
agreement must be reasonable, which is a question of law for the court
to decide.'" However, depending on the type of contract, the court will
apply different levels of scrutiny in determining to the reasonableness
of the contract. 155 If the agreement is ancillary to an employment
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agreement, then a stricter standard is applied. 156 Further, if any
provision of the agreement is considered overbroad or unreasonable, the
entire agreement is invalid.157 But if the agreement is pursuant to a
contract for the sale of a business, a less stringent standard allows
broader provisions. 5 ' Also, even if one provision is deemed over broad
or unreasonable, the court may "blue pencil" to rewrite or sever the
overly-broad provision.'59
A.

Noncompete Agreements

In Martinez v. Davita, Inc.,160 the court of appeals elaborated upon
the doctrine that noncompete agreements relating to an asset sale are
On
held to a less stringent standard than their courterparts. 16'
August 27, 1997, Dr. Martinez sold his East Macon facility to DaVita,
Inc. and entered into several restrictive covenants in the Asset Purchase
Agreement. Execution of the Asset Purchase Agreement was conditioned
on Dr. Martinez's execution of a restrictive covenant contained in a
document entitled "Medical Director Agreement." 62 In pertinent part
the restrictive covenant prohibited Dr. Martinez from participating:
"'either as principal, agent, proprietor, shareholder, director, creditor,
subcontractor, administrator, physician director, medical director, officer,
employee or otherwise, in any entity, trade or business other than
Company [DaVita] providing "Dialysis Services" within the "Restricted

Area."

"163

The "Restricted Area" was designated as any location within forty
miles of the East Macon facility for the duration of the agreement and
"'Dialysis
for two years following termination of the agreement. 6'
Services' was defined as 'the provision of outpatient dialysis treatment,
inpatient dialysis treatment, or dialysis equipment or supplies.' " 16 In
2001 Dr. Martinez began operating a dialysis facility within the fortymile radius prohibited by the agreement. The company notified Dr.
Martinez it would enforce the noncompete clause, and it eventually filed
suit against Dr. Martinez. The trial court granted an interlocutory
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injunction against Dr. Martinez using the more lenient level of scrutiny
generally associated with an asset sale."
On appeal Dr. Martinez contended that the trial court erred in
granting the interlocutory injunction because the noncompete clause in
the Medical Director Agreement constituted an employment contract,
and therefore, should be evaluated under strict scrutiny. He also argued
that the designation "any location" was unreasonably broad and
unenforceable, whether the agreement was an employment contract or
an asset sale.167 The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the grant
of the interlocutory injunction."
First, the court analyzed the reasoning underlying the distinction
between covenants not to compete contained in employment contracts
and those contained in agreements for sale.169 The justification for the
heightened scrutiny is that employment contracts typically involve
parties that are in unequal bargaining positions, whereas a contract for
the sale of a business is more likely to be entered into by parties with
equal bargaining power. 70 Given the justification for the disparate
scrutiny accorded employment contracts and sale agreements, the court
of appeals determined the distinction was meaningless when applied to
Dr. Martinez because "even if not part of the sale of a business, Dr.
Martinez's East Macon Medical Director Agreement was a 'professional
contract' in which the parties had equal bargaining power, making the
covenant subject to at least the 'middle level of reduced scrutiny
accorded [such] professional contracts.'" 1 ' Furthermore, the court of
appeals concluded that the territorial limitation was reasonable despite
the agreement's "'any [other] location'" phraseology.'72 Specifically,
the court of appeals held that the "global" provision was insufficient to
invalidate the agreement because the facilities at issue were within the
forty-mile radius and the provision was part of the sale of a business. 173
In contrast, in BellSouth v. Forsee,7 4 the court of appeals employed
a more rigorous standard in analyzing an employee's covenant not to

166. Id. at 725-26, 598 S.E.2d at 336-37.
167. Id. at 726, 598 S.E.2d at 337.
168. Id. at 727, 598 S.E.2d at 337.
169. Id. at 727-28, 598 S.E.2d at 337.
170. Id. at 727, 598 S.E.2d at 337 (quoting Watson v. Waffle House, 253 Ga. 671, 672,
324 S.E.2d 175 (1985)).
171. Id. at 728, 598 S.E.2d at 338 (quoting Keeley v. Cardiovascular Surgical Assoc.,
236 Ga. App. 26, 30, 510 S.E.2d 880 (1999)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
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compete because it was incident to an employment agreement. 175 In
that case Gary Forsee was the vice chairman of domestic operations for
BellSouth and was chairman of the board of directors for Cingular
Wireless Corporation, a joint venture between BellSouth and SBC
Communications. 7 ' As a condition of his employment, he executed a
covenant not to compete, which stated:
[W]hile employed by BellSouth "or an affiliated company," and for a
period of 18 months after termination from employment, Forsee will
not "provide services ...

in competition with [BellSouth] or any

affiliated company to any person or entity which provides products and
services identical or similar to products and services provided by
[BellSouth] or affiliated companies in the same market(s), whether as
independent contractor, or otherwise, within
an employee, consultant,
177
the territory."
The agreement defined "territory" as the area in which Forsee
provided services "to BellSouth, affiliated companies, and additional
markets listed on an exhibit attached to the agreement." 17' The
"services" which the agreement precluded Forsee from providing were
"'management, strategic planning, business planning, administration, or
other participation in or providing advice with respect to the communications services business .... , ,,79
After Forsee left the company, BellSouth and Cingular both filed
complaints seeking to temporarily enjoin Forsee from accepting
employment from an arch competitor, Sprint. The trial court initially
granted a temporary restraining order to prevent Forsee from accepting
the employment. However, after the trial court conducted an emergency
hearing, it found the noncompete provision unenforceable under Georgia
law and dissolved the portion of the restraining order related to it.'80
Although both BellSouth and Cingular moved to compel arbitration,
the trial court retained jurisdiction over, and invalidated, the noncompete provision.8 1 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision, concluding that the trial court properly kept the covenant from
the consideration of the arbitrator.8 2 The court reasoned:
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A covenant not to compete ancillary to an employment contract has
been held unenforceable on public policy grounds[.] [The] restrictive
covenant ... is unenforceable in that it imposes a greater limitation
... than is necessary for the protection of the employer and does not
specify with particularity the nature of the business activities in which
the employee is forbidden to engage."'
In Hostetler v. Answerthink, Inc.,' Michael Hostetler signed a nonsolicitation agreement as a condition of his employment with the Hackett
Group, a unit of Answerthink, Inc. ("Answerthink"). Although the nonsolicitation agreement contained a Florida choice of law provision, he
executed the agreement in Georgia, and he resided in Georgia."s In
pertinent part the agreement provided:
Non-solicitation... the Employee will not directly or indirectly, during
the two year period immediately following his or her termination of
Employment ... induce or attempt to induce any customer, supplier,
licensee or other business relation of the Company to cease doing
business with the company or in any other way interfere with the
relationship between any such customer, supplier, licensee, or business
relationship and the Company." 6
Hostetler resigned two months after he began his employment and
started his own company, which provided services similar to those of his
previous employer. Hostetler brought an action in Georgia, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the validity and enforceability
of the non-solicitation provision. Answerthink then brought an action
in Florida seeking enforcement of the agreement. Although the Georgia
trial court initially found the provision invalid and entered an injunction
prohibiting Answerthink from enforcing the agreement, it subsequently
reconsidered and entered an order limiting the geographic scope of the
injunction to Georgia. Hostetler appealed, contending that the trial
court erred in limiting the injunctive and declaratory relief to Geor87
The court of appeals agreed and reversed."s
gia."

Because the restrictive covenant contained "no geographic limitation"
and because it prohibited "any type of employment," the court of appeals
determined it violated Georgia's public policy and was void. 8l 9 Then
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the court addressed the choice of law provision set forth in the agreement.1" Reiterating established Georgia law, the court held:
The law of the jurisdiction chosen by parties to a contract to govern
their contractual rights will not be applied by Georgia courts where
application of the chosen law would contravene the policy of, or would
be prejudicial to the interests of, this state. Covenants against disclosure, like covenants against competition, affect the interests of this
state, namely the flow of information needed for competition among
businesses, and hence their validity is determined by the public policy
of this state. 191
Moreover, "[c]hoice of law provisions in agreements executed outside
of Georgia by parties who were outside [of Georgia]" will not be enforced
once the party moves to Georgia if the agreement itself is invalid under
Georgia law.192

B. NonsolicitationAgreements
In Waldeck v. Curtis 1000, Inc., 93 the court of appeals invalidated
a restrictive covenant in an employment contract because it was overly
broad."9' In that case Kevin Waldeck was an employee of Curtis 1000,
Inc. for seventeen years when he resigned and went to work for DSI, a
competitor of Curtis 1000.' 9' Waldeck's nonsolicitation agreement
provided:
C. The Sales Representative agrees that he will not, in the territory
and with respect to the Accounts assigned to him, during the Relevant
Time Period... (ii) actually effect the sale to any Customer Account
of, or accept any offer from any Customer Account for, any product that
is one of the Company's Products or that is substantially similar to or
competitive with any of the Company's Products."9
The defined territory included 26 Georgia counties and 2 Alabama
19 7
counties, and the relevant time period consisted of 730 days.
Notably, "Customer Account" was defined as "'any person, partnership,
corporation or other entity who purchased the Company's Products
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through or from the Sales Representative within the two year period
preceding the Relevant Time Period.'"' 9
The trial court granted an interlocutory injunction against Waldeck to
enforce the nonsolicitation agreement with Curtis 1000.1' The court
of appeals reversed, concluding the nonsolicitation clause was unenforceable because it prevented Waldeck not only from soliciting former
clients, but also from accepting business from unsolicited former clients
for a period of two years after leaving employment, regardless of who
Therefore, the court held the agreement
initiated the contact. 200
constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.20 ' Under the agreement Waldeck was prohibited from accepting any order from any
customer account. ° 2 "This [was] an unreasonable restraint [on trade]
because, in addition to overprotecting Curtis 1000's interests, it
unreasonably impact[edl on Waldeck and on the public's ability to choose
the business it prefer[ed." 2 3
VII.

CONCLUSION

Although labor and employment issues derived from Georgia law often
are not as complex as their federal counterparts, the issues arising
under state law are becoming more challenging with each passing year.
Adding to the challenge is the growing overlap between state and federal
issues. Regardless of whether a practitioner professes to specialize in
state, federal, administrative, trial, or other matters pertaining to labor
and employment law, it is important to recognize that any one law or
legal proceeding can and does impact other relations between employer
and employee.
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